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By CHARLES C. CALLAHAN and EDWIN E. FERGUSON t
IN DRAFTING the new rules for civil procedure in the federal courts
the Supreme Court's committee has dealt sparingly with the law of
evidence. Rule 44 as set out in the committee's report is designed pri-
marily to clear up the confusion which has existed heretofore with regard
to the applicability of state rules of evidence in the federal courts and
to avoid any further confusion which might arise from the union of
law and equity under the new rules.1 Of the several possible methods of
treating these problems, that chosen by the committee is, it is submitted,
best adapted to the situation. A thorough-going revision of the law of
evidence resulting in a code which is substantially complete probably is
not desirable in any case, certainly not in this. A single general rule,
such as one requiring conformity to state law on all matters of evidence,
would aid in alleviating the confusion; but to adopt a rule of this
nature would be to lose an excellent opportunity for eliminating some
of the worst features of the present law of evidence.2 The alternative
followed by the committee is to propose a few rules for specific instances
and a general one to cover the great body of evidence questions.
These rules are welcome ones, for they meet pressing needs. The pur-
pose of this article, in view of the likelihood that there will be a standing
advisory committee, is to suggest additional specific rules which may
well be considered in the future.
Choice of the specific rules to be proposed is not a problem which can
be solved solely by abstract reflection on the "justice" or "reasonableness"
of a particular evidentiary principle. Two practical considerations are
deemed equally important: First, attention should be focused upon those
parts of the law of evidence which have proved most difficult to admin-
ister in the federal courts, i.e., the rules which have required many appel-
late court decisions for their interpretation. Second, little is to be gained
by proposing rules which are not likely to be adopted. Although lawyers
and judges probably are becoming increasingly willing to accept less
t Members of the Ohio and Iowa bars respectively. For the first part of this arti-
cle, see (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 622.
I. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ON
RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE (April 1937). Changes in the rules proposed in the April
draft are recommended by the committee in its final report. FINAL REPORT OF THlE AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE (Nov. 1937). References in this
article are to the rules set out in the April draft as changed in the Final Report.
2. For a general discussion of the problem of evidence in the Federal Courts in
connection with the new rules, see Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Fed-
eral Riles of Civil Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 622.
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stringent rules of procedure, any proposal which departs greatly from
the immediate past is likely to be defeated.
THE GENERAL RULE COVERING ADMISSIBILITY AND C0SPETENCY
The questions of admissibility about which no specific recommenda-
tions are to be made might easily be answered by adopting a single
sweeping rule which would admit all evidence relevant to the issue being
tried. There are many who would like to see such a rule promulgated
and, on the theoretical side, much may be said for it.' Particularly is
this true with reference to the federal courts where the presiding judge
has extensive powers to comment on the evidence. It is likely that less
injustice would be done if all relevant evidence were admitted. But
the practical obstacles in the way of establishing such a system seem
insuperable. Professor 11igmore has stated them clearly:
"To abolish the bulk of the rules now, in the ordinary courts,
would be a futile attempt. To pass a law (supposing this possible,
in the hasty manner of our 'freak' legislationj would amount to
little or nothing. You cannot by fiat legislate away the brain coils
of one hundred thousand lawyers and judges; nor the traditions
embedded in a hundred thousand recorded decisions and statutes.
. . .Any one who knows our profession from within kioous that
it would be a vain dream to think of abolishing the rules of Evidence,
as a system, until all mature practitioners and judges now alive had
passed into the grave. And in the meantime, since trials must go
on, a new generation will have been bred into the same system." 4
It seems, then, that the general rule might better be one which will indi-
cate a point of reference to be used in deciding questions of evidence not
treated specifically. This has been the course pursued by the Advisory
Committee.
A first suggestion which comes to mind is conformity, i.e., to recom-
mend a rule that, except where specifically provided otherwise, the admis-
sibility of evidence in the federal courts shall be determined by the law
of the state in which the court is sitting. This is the easy way out and
certainly a workable one. But it ties the future of a considerable part
of the federal law of evidence to the whims of forty-eight different
court systems; and it may be expected that, for the most part, the states
will tend to follow traditionary rules of evidence without questioning
their present validity. The general rule should permit the federal courts
the greatest possible freedom in applying rules of evidence to meet
changing conditions and needs.
3. See MORGAN and OTHERS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1927) xi.
4. WiGi om, EvIDENcE (2d ed. 1923) 124.
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The rule which the Committee has proposed is a very interesting one
and worthy of close attention. That part of Rule 44 which deals with
the matter at hand is as follows:
"All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the
statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence here-
tofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of
suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts
of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court
is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception
of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented
according to the most convenient method prescribed in any of, the
statutes or rules to which reference is herein made. The compe-
tency of a witness to testify shall be determined in like manner."
The rule provides for conformity where conformity is necessary in
order to render particular evidence admissible. Litigants in the federal
courts are assured of the benefit of any liberal rules of evidence which
may have been written into the law of the particular state in which the
court is sitting. Thus, from the standpoint of a court working under
Rule 44, the first question to be answered when a point of admissibility
is raised is whether the particular evidence is admissible under the law
of the state in which the court is sitting. If the evidence is admissible
under the state law, it is admissible ipso facto in the federal court. Where,
however, the particular evidence is not admissible in the state court, it
does not necessarily follow that it will suffer the same fate in the federal
court. The rule quoted above, "All evidence shall be admitted which is
admissible . . . under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the
courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity-," clearly
indicates that the law of the state which excludes the evidence is not
binding upon the federal court. It has been pointed out elsewhere that
in equity suits the federal courts never have been required to conform
to state rules of evidence, for the operation of both the Conformity Act
and the Rules of Decisions Act is confined to cases on the law side of
the court.' Not being bound to follow the state law excluding the evi-
dence, the court must then determine whether the evidence would have
been admissible in a federal equity suit.
One who goes to the federal equity cases expecting to find a body of
evidence law which will inform him whether particular evidence is ad-
missible in such cases is likely to encounter some difficulty. It has been
shown that relatively few equity cases discuss points of evidence, since
these cases are generally tried without a jury.' True, equity opinions
may be found which repeat such common rules of evidence as the quali-
5. See'the discussion under the heading Equity and Admiralty, Callahan and Fer-
guson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 624.
6. Id., at 625.
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fications and questioning of expert witnesses,- res gestae,8 the admis-
sibility of evidence of prior similar acts," or of self-serving declarations."'
But these seldom attain the dignity of "holdings"; they are usually only
incidental to a discussion of the sufficiency of the proof. In so far
as there is any equity evidence law, there is, with one possible exception
to be mentioned below, no indication that it is different from that applied
in law actions. One old federal case has been found, apparently the
only one which mentions the point, saying that the admissibility of evi-
dence generally is the same in equity as at law."1 Lord Ilardwick-e made
the same statement in three early English cases ;12 and occasionally it is
found in legal texts."3 The exception referred to concerns fraud and
trust cases in which there is some indication that chancery may have
more liberal admissibility standards than the law courts.14
The generalization that the rules of evidence are the same both in
equity and at law will be of little help in determining whether particular
evidence is admissible under that part of Rule 44 referred to above. Since
there is no general agreement as to whether federal courts are required
to follow state rules of evidence in law actions, while in equity they
clearly are not so bound, it is hardly sound to interpret Rule 44 on the
basis that the federal rules of evidence in equity and at law are the same.
The federal equity practice has been free not only of the state rules of
evidence but also, in large part, from any rules at all; and there is no
substantial body of evidence law in federal equity practice.
It is not intended to present a dark picture of the operation of this
part of Rule 44; indeed its virtue seems to lie in the fact that it does
not restrict courts to a particularized body of rules. As to general ques-
tions of admissibility, therefore, the federal courts will have complete
freedom to develop their own rules. This may be somewhat of an over-
statement. The fact that certain evidence, such as flagrant hearsay or
opinion, is not admissible in any court, coupled with the judicial dislike
for sudden change, point to the prediction that, although the federal
courts will be starting practically with a clean slate so far as rules of
7. E.g., Consolidated Gas Utilities Corporation v. Thompson, 14 F. Supp. 318
(IV. D. Tex. 1936).
8. E.g., :Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Railway Co., 293 Fed. 620 (C. C. A. 9th,
1923).
9. E.g., United States v. Milhaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (C. C.
E.D. Wis. 1905).
10. E.g., Sawbill v. Lawrence, 69 F. (2d) 194 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
11. Harmer v. Gwynne, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6.075 (C. C. D. Ohio 1851).
12. Manning v. Lechmere, 1 Ak. 453 (1737); Man v. Vard, 2 Atk. 223 (1741);
Glynn v. Bank of England. 2 Ves. 38 (1750).
13. See BATEs, FEDERAL EQUiTY PRoCEDURn (1901) 441; FL'cnEn, EQuiTY PLEAD-
ING AND PRACICE (1902) at 650.
14. See the opinion of Lord Hardwicks in Man v. IVard, 2 Atk. 223 (1741).
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admissibility are concerned, the new body of precedent will be much
the same as the old in general outline. But the rule of admissibility as
proposed by the Advisory Committee does give the courts a free hand
in applying reforms to individual rules, thus keeping them abreast of
the times. This is all that can be asked of such a general rule and it is
believed likely that the federal courts will so administer the rule that
the results will be much more satisfactory than those which might be
expected under a conformity requirement.
The last sentence of the above quotation from Rule 44 applies the
same test to matters of competency of witnesses. The Competency of
Witnesses Act, at present in force, provides that:
"The competency of a witness to testify in any civil action, suit
or proceeding in the courts of the United States shall be determined
by the law of the State or Territory in which the court is held.""'
Since this statute is applicable to suits in equity as well as to actions at
law, 6 the law of the state in which the federal court is sitting is the
criterion of competency under any of the alternatives of Rule 44. The
new form of stating the rule does have an advantage, however, in that
it makes it clear that any federal competency statutes which may subse-
quently be adopted will control over the state law without conflicting
with the rule.
The present draft as well as the preliminary one imply approval of
the present state of the law with regard to competency, and this approval
seems in general to be justified. True, rules of competency, or more
precisely of "incompetency", remain which may be criticized as out-
moded and vestigial; but the last century has seen the abandonment, by
statutes, of so much that was senseless that a "common law" of com-
petency scarcely can be said to exist today.
Although the state competency statutes are generally satisfactory, there
is one notorious exception which requires special attention. Most states
have seen fit to enact statutes whose devious forms clothe the common
principle that the survivor of a transaction with a deceased or incom-
petent person may not testify as to that transaction against the legal
representatives of such a person. The statutes exist in almost all of
the states. I" When a justification of the rule is attempted, it consists
either of the mechanical repetition of the maxim, "If death has closed the
lips of the one party, the policy of the law is to close the lips of the
other",' or of an elaboration of the evils thought to be guarded against:
15. 34 STAT. 618 (1906), 28 U. S. C. A. § 631 (1926).
16. See Rowland v. Biesecker, 181 Fed. 128 (C. C. N. Y. 1910), aff'd 185 Fed. 515
(C. C. A. 2d, 1911).
17. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1937) § 1880; ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-
Hurd, 1935) Ch. 51, par. 2; N. Y. Civ. PpAc. AcT § 347; PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon,
1936) tit. 28 § 322.
18. See Louis v. Easton, 50 Ala. 470, 471 (1873).
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"The law in the exception to the privilege to testify was intended
to prevent an undue advantage on the part of the living over the
dead, who cannot confront the survivor, or give his version of the
affair, or expose the omission, mistakes or perhaps falsehouds of
such survivor. The temptation to falsehood and concealment in such
cases is considered too great to allow the surviving party to testify
in his own behalf. Any other view of this subject, I think, would
place in great peril the estates of the dead, and would in fact make
them an easy prey for the dishonest and unscrupulous." 10
The implications of this argument are obvious: (1) the number of per-
sons who will perjure themselves in order to gain an undue advantage
in the settlement of an estate is so great that we are justified in barring
from the witness stand all those who have honest claims or defenses
against estates, thus making the proof of the honest matter difficult and
often impossible, (2) those dishonest survivors will be such consummate
liars that cross examination will be powerless to expose them, and (3)
the court and jury will be incompetent to weigh the credibility of such
persons' testimony."0 Thus stated, the argument refutes itself. Another
fallacy in the reasoning behind the rule, if indeed more need be pointed
out, has been suggested. 2 ' When a claimant is willing to commit perjury
he is likely also to be willing to suborn perjury. The statutes which
apply only to surviving parties and not to disinterested witnesses would
thus be ineffective against the perjuror and effective only against the
honest claimant.
But the indictment of the "dead man" statutes need not rest solely
on considerations of their shortcomings in theory. In practice the stat-
utes have cluttered up the dockets of appellate courts ever since their
enactment, and a large number of decisions has been required for their
interpretation. The situation in New York is typical.2 A survey by
the evidence committee of the Commonwealth Fund indicates that, up
to 1921, the New York statute had been before the appellate courts
three hundred twenty-four times. Moreover, the North Carolina statute,
to 1919, had been considered in two hundred and twenty-one cases; and
the Minnesota statute, to 1917, had been up before the highest court
of that state one hundred and thirty-two times.' The federal courts,
since they are required to follow the state laws as to competency, have
similarly had their share of the labor of interpreting these statutes.'
19. See Owens v. Owens, 14 AV. Va. 88, 95 (1878).
20. See "WIG-MORE, EVIDENCE (2d ea 1923) § 578; MoaoAn and OTHERs, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 24 et seq.
21. MORGAN and OTHERS, 10C. cit. mspra note 20.
22. GREENF7iE, A TREATiSE ON TESTnMaOY UNDER § 347, CIVIL PaAcTrim Acr
(1923).
23. MORGAN and OTHERs, op. cit. smpra note 3, at 27.
24. See, e.g., Martin v. Luster, 85 F (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) (Wisconsin);
Northern Trust Co. v. Elman, 72 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934) (Ohio).
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The results of their labors have been catalogued in the Federal Digest
under 139 separate headings. On the other hand, the more liberal statutes
enacted in a few states have evoked few interpretive appellate court
decisions. 29
The "dead man" statutes are thus untenable both in theory and prac-
tice, and it seems highly desirable that the new federal rules should
eliminate them. The abrogation of the "dead man" rule in the federal
courts not only would promote justice and relieve congestion in these
courts themselves but also would be an excellent start toward overcoming
the inertia in the states.26
But what form should the rule take? Under all the state statutes which
admit the testimony of an interested survivor some antidote is prescribed
in order to protect the estate of the deceased. As has been stated, the
danger to the estate of the deceased is not believed actually to be great.
But if some protection can be provided without introducing an offsetting
or overbalancing injustice and without prejudice to the practical opera-
tion of the rule, it should, of course, be introduced. The method of the
Virginia and New Mexico statutes, which allow the interested survivor
to testify as to transactions with the deceased but refuse him a judg-
ment unless his testimony is corroborated, is open both to theoretical
and practical objection.27 One of the principal indictments of the strin-
gent "dead man" statutes is that the proof of an honest claim often is
made difficult or impossible when the surviving party cannot testify. To
allow him to testify but to require that his testimony be corroborated is
to place the same stumbling block in his path, unless the degree of cor-
roboration required is very slight. A second criticism arises from the
term "corroboration". It is impossible to define this concept in such a
way as to avoid squabbling over the amount of corroboration necessary
to support a judgment for the survivor. This had been the experience in
both Virginia and New Mexico. 2  Another method, allowing the testi-
mony of the interested survivor to be admitted only when, in the dis-
cretion of the triil judge, justice demands it, is employed in a fashion
which subjects it to much the same sort of objection. Appellate tribunals
immediately begin to formulate and lay down rules for the guidance of
the trial court in the exercise of its discretion.29 On the other hand,
little difficulty has been experienced by the states whose statutes allow
the testimony of the interested survivor to come in freely and protect
the estates of deceased persons by also admitting in evidence the relevant
25. See MORGAN and OTHERS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 29.
26. Legis. (1935) 46 HARV. L. Rrv. 834, 838.
27. VA. CODE (Michie, 1936) §6209; N. MEX. STAT. ANN. (1929) §45-601.
28. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Jewell, 153 Va. 315, 149 S. E. 409 (1929); In re Cardoner's
Estate, 27 N. Mex. 105, 196 Pac. 327 (1921).
29. E.g., Harvey v. Hilliard, 47 N. H. 551 (1867).
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entries, memoranda and declarations of the deceased. In the survey
conducted by the Commonwealth Fund Committee, lawyers and judges
who had had experience in a "great many" cases involving the Connecti-
cut statute voted six to one to retain such a statute unamended.Y° Under
this plan the honest interested survivor is in no way hampered in the
proof of his case, and the dishonest one may find himself embarrassed in
establishing his fraudulent claim. On the whole this method of handling
the problem seems quite satisfactory and far superior to the other types
of statutory regulation of the "dead man" situation. The rule here sug-
gested is that of conformity to state practice, proposed by the Committee,
with an exception which follows, in content, the Connecticut statute :3"
Competency of Witnesses. In actions or proceedings by or against
the representatives of deceased or incompetent persons no person
shall be disqualified, by reason of such death or incompetency, to
testify as to any matter relevant to the issue or issues being tried
[and no statement or declaration, whether written or oral, of the
deceased or incompetent person shall be excluded from evidence
as hearsay, provided that the court shall first find that the state-
ment or declaration was in fact made by the deceased or incompe-
tent person in good faith and on personal knowledge]. In other
respects the competency of a witness to testify shall lie determined
by the law of the state in which the court is held. 2
THE RULE THAT A PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OWN WITNESS
The specific rules of evidence recommended by the committee in Rule
44 are confined to those relating to examination and credibility of wit-
nesses. The Rule allows impeachnent of any witness by proof of con-
tradictory statements; adverse parties may be called, interrogated by
leading questions and impeached; hostile witnesses may be interrogated
by leading questions; and cross-examination may extend to all the ma-
terial issues of the action except where the witness is an adverse party.
It has already been adequately demonstrated that the principle of evi-
dence which prohibits a party's impeaching his own witness is without
sound theoretical justification.3 3 It may be pointed out, however, that
the attacks upon the principle have not been wholly of an academic
30. MORGAx and OTHERS, Op. cit. stpra note 3. at 89 et seq.
31. A rule of this nature was approved by the Committee of the Comnonwealth
Fund. Id. at 35; see also Legis. (1935) 46 HAw'. L Rsv. 834.
32. If the rule set out infra p. 207, which makes all hearsay statements of deceased
or incompetent persons admissible in any action, is adopted the portion of this rule which
is enclosed in brackets will be superfluous.
33. See Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-Ncw Developments (1935)
4 U. oF CHI. L. REV. 69; MORGAx and OinERs, op. cit. stpra note 3, at xvi, n. 1;
Cf. NVIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 899.
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nature and that the courts, as well as the legislatures, have become in-
creasingly aware of its uselessness.
A party may wish to do one of several things when he finds himself
in the position of having called a witness whose testimony is damaging
to the party's case:
First, he may wish to impeach the character of the witness. This he
clearly cannot do under the rule now in force ;34 and federal decisions
have held that he may not even be heard to argue that his witness is
unworthy of belief. 5
Second, he may wish to show that his witness is biased against him
by reason of his interest in the outcome of the action or through cor-
ruption. Professor Wigmore states that this is usually included within
the general prohibition against impeachment; but the cases in support
of his view are few and no federal decisions bearing directly upon the
point have been found."6
Third, a party may wish to show that a witness previously has made
statements which differ from those made on the stand. It is around
this point that most of the decisions have turned and around which most
of the confusion centers. Usually the courts have taken a position of
compromise between the free admission and the absolute exclusion of
such evidence. One such compromise prohibits the introduction of any
independent evidence of such contradictory statements but allows the wit-
ness to be questioned about them in order to refresh his recollection and
induce him to make a correction."' A second rule permits the witness
to be questioned about the prior statement and also allows outside testi-
mony to be offered if the witness proves "hostile"." The most common
form of the rule relative to prior contradictory statements is that which
allows such statements to be shown if the party has been "surprised";
this is the view maintained in most of the federal cases."9
A fourth alternative is cross examination of the witnesses giving the
unfavorable testimony. This is closely connected with the third alterna-
tive, but is concerned with the form of the examination rather than with
the matters touched upon.4"
34. See id., at § 900.
35. See Ashley v. Board of Supervisors of Presque Isle County, 83 Fed. 534
(C. C. A. 6th, 1897); Choctaw & Memphis Railroad Co. v. Newton, 140 Fed. 225, 250
(C. C.A. 8th, 1905).
36. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 901 and cases there cited; see also Ladd,
op. cit. supra note 33, at 83, n. 65.
37. See, e.g., Babcock v. People, 13 Colo. 515 (1889) (the qualification that the
party must be "surprised" is also added.)
38. WIGo1RE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 904.
39. Swift & Co. v. Short, 92 Fed. 567 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899); Hickory v. United
States, 151 I. S. 303 (1894).
40. Cf. St. Clair v. United States, 154 U. S. 134 (1894).
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Several jurisdictions have dealt by statute with the problem of im-
peaching one's own witness. Indeed the prohibition of impeachment had
been established only about fifty years when the first of the statutes
restricting the scope of the rule was enacted.41 In 1854 a statute was
enacted in England which provided:
"A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach
his credit by general evidence of bad character; but he may, in case
the witness shall in the opinion of the judge prove adverse, contra-
dict him by other evidence, or by leave of the judge prove that he
has made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present
testimony; but before such last mentioned proof can be given, the
circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the
particular occasion must be mentioned to the witness, and he must
be asked whether or not he has made such statement." 42
Statutes similar to this one are found in Florida, New Mexico, Vermont,
and Virginia.43 The element of surprise has been embodied in the stat-
utes of Georgia and the District of Columbia."4 Some ten states have
statutes allowing impeachment by proof of prior inconsistent statements
without any requirement that the witness be adverse or that the party
calling him be surprised 4 In addition to allowing proof of contradictory
statements in any situation, the Indiana statute allows impeachment by
evidence of bad character when it was indispensable that the party should
produce the witness or when there is "manifest surprise".
A suggested statute in New York goes farther than any of the other
state rules toward the complete abolition of the common law doctrine
of impeachment. It allows impeachment by showing contradictory state-
ments, by showing bias or corruption and by showing the bad character
of the witness. Only in the latter instance is its operation limited. 40
'Which policy should the federal rules adopt? It will be noted that
-the proposed Rule 44 expressly permits impeachment only by proof of
contradictory statements, thereby conforming to most of the statutes
mentioned above.4  Under the Rule as proposed by the Advisory Com-
41. See NWIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 896.
42. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, §22 (1854). See the history of the legislation in Ladd,
loc. cit. supra note 33.
43. FLA. Co P. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1927) §4377; N. M. STAT. Amn. (Courtright,
1929) § 45-607; VT. PuB. LAws (1934) § 1702; VA. CODE (Michice, 1936) § 6215.
44. GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1933) § 38-1801 ("entrapped" substituted for "sur-
prised") ; D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 9, § 21.
45. E.g., IthN. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §2-1726; see also TFx. Az;. CoDE Cniu.
PRoc. (Vernon, 1926) Art. 732.
46. REPORT OF THE COMsMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE I' NEW Yoai
STATE (1934) 299.
47. "The earlier legislation stopped far short of an adequate treatment of the
problem by dealing only with impeachment by prior inconsistent statements." Ladd,
op. cit. supra note 33, at 91.
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mittee a witness who is unwilling or hostile may be asked leading ques-
tions, but the party should likewise be left free to show bias interest or
corruption by independent evidence if he wishes to do so.48 There are
no valid reasons of policy which operate to exclude such evidence.
That a party should be permitted to impeach the character of his own
witness is not so clear. Here a point of policy does exist. If a party
may attack the character of a witness whom he has called, he may bring
pressure to bear upon the witness. This matter of policy was strong
enough to induce the framers of most of the state statutes mentioned
above expressly to exclude such impeachment. But this policy argument
breaks down when it is remembered that even though a witness testify
favorably to the party calling him under fear of an attack upon his
character it is likely that the attack will nevertheless be made by the
opposite side.49 It is not often that a party will want to attack the char-
acter of his own witness; the impression created is likely to react too
strongly against the party's case. But when a situation arises in which
a litigant is willing to assume this risk, rather than to leave unchallenged
testimony which is damaging and believed to be false, the testimony
should be admitted. It is proposed that the common law rule against a
party's impeaching his own witness should be discarded. Since most juris-
dictions have already made inroads on the rule, there are no great prac-
tical obstacles preventing the adoption of a proposal such as the following:
"A party may impeach any witness by proof of contradictory
statements or by evidence of bias or corruption or in any other man-
ner."
STATEMENTS OF PERSONS UNAVAILABLE AS WITNESSES
The hearsay rule and its exceptions have been said to comprise the
largest part of what truly belongs to the law of evidence."' An assumption
implicit in most exclusionary rules is that human testimony is so likely
to be untrustworthy that the jury or the court, should be permitted to
hear it only after every available safeguard against untruth has been
erected. Oaths are required of witnesses and penalties are provided for
perjury; the atmosphere of the court room is one of solemnity; the rights
of confrontation and cross-examination are guarded jealously. These
safeguards are looked upon as so important that, as a general rule, no
testimony however pertinent or important is allowed to come in if it is
not subject to them. The fact that hearsay testimony generally is not
so safeguarded is the reason generally given for its exclusion. "1 Another
48. WIGmOma, EvIDENcE § 901.
49. See id., at § 899.
50. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATIS ox€ EviDxcF (1898) 518.
51. WIGMORE, EvmENCE § 1362; Strahorn, Extra-Legal Materials and Evidence
(1934) 29 IL. L. REv. 300, 312.
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reason is the common sense one that the trustworthiness of a story
decreases in inverse ratio to the number of times it is told. -
The supposed advantages of the hearsay rule in guarding the trust-
worthiness of testimony are, however, probably much over-estimated,
while its harm in excluding relevant and important testimony appears con-
siderable. The best argument against the hearsay rule, though, lies in the
great number of exceptions to it as well as in the amount of difficulty,
and consequent "law", which they have engendered. The fact that
almost the entire third volume of Professor Wigmore's monumental work
on evidence discudses the exceptions to this rule is indicative of the great
amount of judicial administration which the mass of hearsay rules
requires.
The numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule are diverse in character
and apply, in many instances, to rather unimportant situations. But
there is, to some degree, a logical connection among them; they apply
to situations in which, for one reason or another, the hearsay is believed
likely to be trustworthy, even though it is not subjected, or is subjected
only partially, to the safeguards mentioned above. An additional element
common to the hearsay exceptions is that they operate only when neces-
sity demands it. The "necessity", however, is of varying degrees. In
all instances it is true, and rightly so, that the hearsay cannot come in if
the person who made the statement is himself present and available as
a witness. In order to admit dying declarations, statements against inter-
est, statements of pedigree, and documentary witnesses, proof of absolute
impossibility of obtaining the testimony from the original source is
necessary; a common requirement is the death of the person in question,
although in some instances other reasons are accepted. But something
less than impossibility of obtaining the original person's testimony is
sufficient in the exceptions for official statements, statements of mental
or physical condition and spontaneous exclamations.'
Criticism of the hearsay rule may be directed at the limited and
diverse character of its exceptions. The fact is that there is no reason,
other than the accidents of history, to explain the limits of these ex-
ceptions. As a matter of history they are not, in fact, true exceptions,
but are, in many instances, independent rules as old or older than the
hearsay rule itself. 4 To suggest further exceptions to meet specific
problems is unthinkable; they are already so numerous as to be unman-
ageable. They must either remain as they are or be telescoped and
simplified, so far as possible, in one or more broad generalizations.
Happily the present exceptions have a common ground which makes the
52. This theory or reason is said by Wigmore to be spurious or merely supplemen-
tary. EvmExcE § 1363.
53. See under the separate discussion of these exceptions, 3 W.Morn., EVmDEcE.
54. THuzmm, op. cit. supra note 58, at 519, 520. See VGMionn, EVIDzCE § 1426.
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latter course possible: the unavailability of the original declarant as a
witness.Y5 It may be said that the unavailability of the original declarant
is not the only test for the hearsay exceptions, that there is the require-
ment that the circumstances of the declaration be such that it is likely
to be true. To this there are two answers. First, the rule may, and
probably should, provide that before such hearsay testimony is admitted
it shall be found by the court that the statement was made by the
declarant in good faith, on his own personal knowledge, and before the
instant action was begun. Second, the guarantee of truth supposed to
be inherent in the present exceptions has been shown to be largely an
illusion. 6
The suggestion that a rule making hearsay statements of deceased per-
sons admissible be put into effect is not purely a theoretical one. A
statute to this effect has been in force in Massachusetts for nearly forty
years. Its present form is substantially the same as that of the original:
"A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in
evidence as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good faith
before the commencement of the action and upon the personal
knowledge of the declarant.""
In proposing a rule similar to that of Massachusetts for the federal
courts we can be reassured by the experience of that state that this
statute is not only sound in theory but workable in practice. It has un-
doubtedly liberalized the rules governing the admissibility of evidence
in Massachusetts."8 It has, moreover, the unqualified approval of those
who work under it. The answers received to a questionnaire sent to
lawyers and judges indicated that evidence coming in under the statute
is important in a large number of cases and that an overwhelming
majority favored its retention. About three-fourths of the lawyers who
had considerable experience with the statute felt that it aids in deter-
mining the truth rather than encouraging perjury."
But to enact the rule in the form of the Massachusetts statute would
be to leave a job only partly done. Why should the admission of hear-
say declarations be limited to those made by persons who are unavailable
as witnesses because they are dead? The necessity for resorting to
secondary evidence in instances of insanity is just as great as in cases
where the declarant is dead; indeed in all their pertinent aspects the
situations of death and insanity are identical.60 The question then arises,
55. WIGMoRE, EVIENCE, at § 1427.
56. MORGAN and OTHERS, op. cit. mipra note 3, at 38.
57. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 233, § 65. The original statute is Acts 1898, c. 535.
58. See e.g., In re Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N. E. 65 (1934).
59. MORGAN and OTHERS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 40 et seq.
60. The statute recommended by the Committee of the Commonwealth Fund places
death and insanity on an equal footing in this regard. MORGAN and OTnERs, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 49.
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should not the rule allow the reception of the testimony when it is
shown that for any good reason it is either impossible or highly imprac-
ticable to secure the attendance of the witness in person or to take his
deposition? It is the fact that the witness is unavailable which is of
importance; the cause of his unavailability is irrelevant. Of course, a
party should not be permitted to present hearsay testimony merely upon
the allegation that the declarant is not available, since there is always
the danger that a witness will not be produced in order to avoid his
being cross-examined. But if the court were to admit hearsay testimony
only after being convinced that the declarant was in fact unavailable
and that his absence was bona-fide, little of this danger would remain. 1
The effect of liberalizing the operation of the hearsay rule along the
lines indicated above would clear up much of the confusion resulting
from the present multiplicity of exceptions. The following rule is be-
lieved to be a practicable one for improving the justice, and at the same
time facilitating the administration, of the hearsay rule:
Statements or Declarations of Persons Unavailable as Witnesses.
No statement or declaration, whether written or oral, shall be ex-
cluded from evidence as hearsay in any proceeding under these rules
if the court shall find (1) that the declarant is dead or insane or that
after due diligence the party offering such testimony is unable to
produce the declarant in court and is unable to take his deposition
and (2) that such statement or declaration was made in good faith
before the commencement of the proceeding and on the declarant's
personal knowledge.
THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Communications between physician and patient were not privileged at
the common law.012 It was not until 1828 that the statutory innovation
established a privilege for such communications in New York;C3 the
revisers felt that "unless such consultations are privileged, men will be
incidentally punished by being obliged to suffer the consequences of
injuries without relief from the medical art, and without conviction of
any offense."64 Their fears seem to have been based more upon an
early English dictum than upon observation and experience.05 But what-
ever the basis may have been, the New York statute was subsequently
adopted by thirty states. 6
61. If the evidence is objectionable on any ground other than hearsay it could not,
of course, come in under such a rule.
62. 5 VIGME o-, EVIDENCE § 2380.
63. 2 N. Y. REv. STAT. (1828) 406.
64. 3 Comiaiissioxms oN REVIsioN OF THE STATUTES OF NwE Yonn (1836) 737.
65. See Purrington, An Abused Privilege (1906) 6 CoL L RE%. 388, 392-393.
66. E.g., CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. (Deering, 1937) § 1881, par. 4; Micr. Co:w. LAws
(1929) § 14216; N. Y. C. P. A. (Parson, 1936) § 352; PA. STAT. AmN. (Purdon, 1936)
Tit. 28, § 328.
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It is not intended here to repeat the virulent and justifiable attacks
which have been made upon the privilege. Professor Wigmore has
thoroughly summed up the case against it, and concludes that "the adop-
tion of it in any other jurisdictions is earnestly to be deprecated". 1
That the states which have sanctioned the privilege are beginning to
realize their mistake is borne out by the statutory restrictions prevailing
in many jurisdictions. Nearly all the statutes make a provision for
waiver.68 Most Workmen's Compensation Acts specifically provide that
a physician who has examined the employee-claimant may be required
to testify."' Several states except from the privilege testimony in mal-
practice actions.70 There are a few statutes excepting personal injury
actions.7 And a Washington statute provides for the appointment by
the court of a physician to examine an injured party for the purpose
of qualifying himself to testify concerning personal injuries.12 In Colo-
rado the offer of a physician as a witness is deemed a waiver. 8 An
Oklahoma statute makes it unlawful for a physician knowingly to
conceal, withhold or misrepresent facts concerning health, age, cause
of death or other material information regarding the insured, in an ac-
tion on a policy issued by a mutual benefit association;74 this has been
held to override the general privilege statute in such actions. 6 The present
Wisconsin statute excepts lunacy inquiries, and homicide prosecutions
when the disclosure relates directly to the fact, or immediate circum-
stances, of the homicide. It also sanctions waiver of the privilege by
a beneficiary of an insurance policy.76
A Pennsylvania statute creates a privilege only for communications
which tend to malign the character of the patient.77 The courts of that
state have further narrowed the application of the privilege statute by
67. 5 WIGoRE, Evimzxcz § 2380.
68. Only those of Arkansas, Indiana, Missouri, and North Carolina contain no
waiver provision. In the three states first named, waiver is nevertheless allowed. Schir-
mer v. Baldwin, 182 Ark. 581, 32 S. W. (2d) 162 (1930); Becknell v. Hosier, 10 Ind.
App. 5, 37 N. E. 580 (1894); Groll v. Tower, 85 Mo. 249 (1884). A proviso in the
North Carolina statute makes a waiver provision unnecessary. See text p. 209 infra.
69. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 7567; Micn. Comp. LAws (1929) § 8435.
70. E.g., Cow. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) c. 177, § 9; cf. NzV. CoMP. LAws (Hillyer,
1930) § 8974.
71. E.g., CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. (Deering, 1937) § 1881, par. 4; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1936) Tit. 28, § 328. See WiGmom, EviDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2380(4), 2389.
72. WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 1230-1.
73. CoLO. STAT. ANN. (Mills, 1930) c. 177, § 10.
74. Oxa-A. STAT. ANN. (Harlow, 1931) § 272.
75. Oklahoma Protective Ass'n v. Montgomery, 160 Okla. 135, 16 P. (2d) 135
(1932).
76. Wis. STAT. (1935) § 325.21. See In re Gallum's Estate, 215 Wis. 314, 254 N. W.
542 (1934).
77. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) Tit. 28, § 328.
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refusing to extend it to criminal cases."' The North Carolina legislators
have attempted to avoid the injustices inherent in other privilege statutes
by adding the proviso: "that the presiding judge of a superior court may
compel such disclosure if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper
administration of justice."" And California, starting in 1872 with legis-
lative enactment of the usual privilege rule, has whittled down the scope
of the rule to a point where the only important group of cases within
the privilege is that involving actions on insurance policies, and here
the insurer may protect himself by inserting a waiver clause in the
application or the policy."'
It is assumed by some writers and jurists that the physician-patient
privilege does have a proper, though restricted, sphere of operation.81
This assumption is postulated upon a belief that one who desires secrecy
should not, for that reason, be deterred from seeking medical aid. But
there are actually few instances in which secrecy is seriously desired.
Wigmore mentions venereal disease and criminal abortion cases in this
connection.82 But it is exceedingly doubtful whether the privilege ever
makes for a fuller disclosure by the patient. Rarely does the patient
foresee the future litigation in which the injury will assume importance. 3
Probably the strongest argument against the physician-patient privilege
lies in the fact that in eighteen states it has never been sanctioned by
either the legislature or the courts,84 and a very few decisions have been
found in these jurisdictions in which an attempt was made to invoke
the privilege.85 It is, moreover, significant that little or nothing has been
written to defend this rule of evidence against the increasing number
of attacks against it. A proposal for the abolition of the privilege has
78. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 318 Pa. 1, 178 Atl. 20 (1935)
79. N. C. CODE AwN. (Michie, 1935) § 1798. The finding of necessity must appear
in the record, in order that the physician will be protected from criticism for his dis-
closure. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 194 N. C. 199, 139 S. E. 223 (1927).
Compare (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 703, 706 (attorney-client privilege).
80. See Comment (1936) 9 So. CAL. L. REv. 143.
81. See (1927) 164 L. T. 10.
82. 5 ,VIGMoR, EviDENcE § 2380(4). One might, too, wish his physical condition to
be kept secret for a legitimate reason, business, family or social.
83. Purrington, op. cit. snpra note 65, at 396; Emory, I aivr of Patient's Privi-
leges (1931) 6 ,VAsH. L. REv. 71, 72; Comment (1936) 9 So. CAL L REV. 149, 150.
84. The eighteen states are: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia.
85. The Kentucky court has held that the rejection of a physician's testimony on
an objection of privilege was error, for the reason that the common law rule obtained.
There was no further comment. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Crockett's Adm'x,
232 Ky. 726, 24 S. NV. (2d) 580 (1930). In 1935, the privilege was held properly denied
in Connecticut: "information acquired by physicians in their professional capacity has
never been privileged in Connecticut." Again, no further comment. Zeiner v. Zeiner,
120 Conn. 161, 179 Atl. 644 (1935).
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in fact been made in the very state which passed the first privilege
statute."8 The proposal that the privilege be abolished in the federal
courts will meet with a great many objections. It is true that one of the
arguments for uniformity of evidence rules in the federal courts has
little weight here: litigation involving the physician-patient privilege is
generally of a private and local nature, and is of no great public im-
portance. It is also true that a rule abolishing the privilege would con-
flict with the declared "public policy" of many of the states. Moreover,
as a consequence of the rule, there might be some increase in litigation,
where cases come within federal jurisdiction. But the hardships created
by the privilege should be an ample answer to any suggestion of con-
formity. As to the "public policy" argument, it would seem that the
actual design of the legislation has been furthered not a whit. And a
possible increase of litigation in the federal courts is a small price to
pay for the abrogation of a rule which seems to work only injustice.
Furthermore, action by the Supreme Court might well set an example
for the states to follow. The following rule is therefore proposed:
Communications to Physicians, Surgeons or Nurses. The testi-
mony of a physician, surgeon, or nurse87 shall not be excluded on
the ground that the information of the witness was acquired through
a communication made to him in his professional capacity.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Despite the absence of a survey of cases applying the process of
judicial notice to determine the extent to which it is employed, there is
general agreement that this principle is not being used to full advantage,
and it is apparent that many undesirable restrictions have crystallized.8"
Judicially cognizable matters may be grouped into two broad divisions:
phenomena which are actually or in theory known to the judge in the
exercise of his judicial function, and factual matters which, were it not
for their "notoriety" or "capability of unquestionable demonstration",
ordinarily would be subjects of proof before a jury or a judge sitting
as a fact-trier.8" It is elementary that the federal courts will notice federal
and state statutes and decisions. But, in keeping with the distinctions
made in state decisions, federal courts have refused to take judicial
notice of foreign law, private statutes, or municipal ordinances. 0 Gen-
86. A. B. C. N. Y. YEAR BOOK (1930) 247.
87. The privilege statutes of several states extend to nurses. E.g., N. M. STAT.
ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §45-512 as amended N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1933)
c. 33; N. Y. C. P. A. (Parson, 1936) § 352.
88. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2583.
89. See Strahorn, The Process of Judicial Notice (1928) 14 VA. L. REv. 544.
90. See, e.g., Booth Fisheries Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 84 F (2d) 49
(C. C. A. 7th, 1936). Foreign law will be noticed in so far as it is international. The
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erally, they will notice the rules and regulations of federal executive
departments, 9 but the cases are not uniform . 2 Why the distinctions?
No one can seriously contend that those legal phenomena which courts
refuse judicially to notice have any inherent characteristics justifying
distinct treatment. The explanation would seem to lie in the availability
or non-availability of source material. Thus, courts have had ready
access to public statutes and decisions and departmental regulations either
in their own or nearby libraries, but private statutes, municipal ordi-
nances, and material of value on foreign law have not been so easily
obtainable.
The increasing availability to the courts of source material is the most
important single factor responsible for the gradually increasing scope
of the state rules upon judicial notice of legal phenomena- an evolu-
tion which is characterized chiefly by statutes requiring or permitting
judicial notice of private law,"3 of laws of other states,"4 and of foreign
law,95 and by various statutory half-liberalizations of the general rule
against judicial notice of municipal ordinances." Acquisition of source
material may be a burden on the court, but this fact should be no ground
for refusing notice if counsel's brief is adequate." Nor should this
procedure result in unfair advantage over an adversary. It has been
pointed out that an opponent seldom if ever would fail to discern from
the pleadings which points of law were going to be relied on at the
trial."' In any case, it is difficult to see how there could be any greater
degree of surprise in these instances than when the public law of
Scotia, 14 Wall. 170 (U. S. 1871). U. S. v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452 (1895). No case
has been found in which state statutes requiring judicial notice of foreign law have
been dealt with in the Federal courts, although it would ,eem that the courts wuuld
be bound to follow the state law under the conformity acts. See Seattle R. & S. Ry. Co.
v. City of Seattle, 190 Fed. 75 (C. C. AV. D. Wash. 1911) (state statute requiring judicial
notice of municipal ordinances followed upon pleading by reference).
91. See, e.g., Anderson v. Akers, 7 F. Supp. 924 (D. C. Ky. 1934).
92. In Nagle v. United States, 145 Fed. 302 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906) the court refused
to notice post-office regulations because the burden of investigation would be too great.
See also Thompson v. M6issouri Pac. P. Co., 15 F. (2d) 28, 31 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
93. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering, 1937) § 1875(3); Co!;s:. GEN . STAT.
(1930) §5599. Other states provide for notice of private statutes upon pleading by
reference. E.g., Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 804; N. C. Com AN. (Michie,
1935) § 541.
94. E.g., CAL CODE Civ. PROC. (Deering, 1937) § 1875(3); CoN.N. Gr... STAT.
(1930) §§ 5599, 5600. See Comments (1930) 10 B. U. L REV. 417; (1928) 42 H, V.
L. REv. 130.
95. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 5599, 5600.
96. E.g., ILL REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 51, § 48a; N. Y. Cos;soL. L (Ca-
hill, 1930) c. 6, § 32. By statute or decision, municipal courts are often permitted to
notice ordinances of their respective cities despite any contrary rule applicable to state
courts. E.g., Iu- REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 37, § 414.
97. Strahorn, op. cit. supra note 89, at 555-556.
98. Comment (1933) 46 HAav. L REv. 1019, 1021.
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another state is noticed under the present rule. The surprise, if any,
would be due to counsel's carelessness rather than to any defect in rule.
Is it because counsel cannot be trusted? Hardly, when opposing counsel
is permitted to check his every statement, and when a wilful falsehood
may mean disbarment. Argument by opposing attorneys is used every
day in cases involving judicial notice of federal and state law. An ex-
tension to foreign law, private statutes, and municipal ordinances does
not appear to be unwarranted.
Of course, it would be unwise to require a federal court to notice
foreign law, private statutes, and ordinances. Counsels' briefs may be
inadequate. It is well known that municipal records are generally in
a disorderly and unsystematized condition." Foreign law based on a
different system of jurisprudence may require more than mere statement
and argument; the court should not be called upon to make unreasonable
researches, and in such cases might rightfully require proof. Where the
court has no sufficient basis for making a ruling favorable to the judi-
cial cognition of the particular law before it and therefore requires
proof, such proof should be made to the court and not to a jury.100
It is generally understood that judicially noticeable facts must have
the qualities of notoriety and such certainty as to foreclose any bona ,fide
dispute. 101 Yet where a matter is capable of unquestionable demonstra-
tion the federal courts, on the whole, have shown little hesitancy in
dropping the yardstick of notoriety.0 This is as it should be. If counsel
can show from reliable sources that a matter is true, whether or not
notorious, the matter should be judicially noticed.10 3 The reliability of
such sources may of course be questioned; in such an instance the court
can call for further proof. Is there any way of insuring to litigants in
federal courts a consistently liberal attitude toward the notice of factual
matters? A general rule stating broad classifications into which judi-
cially noticeable facts fall would likely prove an empty and futile gesture:
empty, because it would utter mere platitudes every law student knows;
futile, because every instance will be decided on its own particular merits
without regard to precedent or authority except insofar as they contain
guiding principles.10 4 A detailed rule,105 pointing out specifically various
99. See (1920) 29 YA.E L. J. 460.
100. Cf. HANDBoo OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMMISSIoNFRS ON UNIFOR.M
STATE LAWS AN]) PROCEEDINGS (1935) 285.
101. See Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 Pac. 223 (1919).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Fifty-two One Gallon Cans, 16 F. Supp. 385 (D.
Conn. 1935).
103. Several state statutes provide that historical books, books of science or art, and
published maps and charts are "prima facie evidence of facts of general notoriety and
interest." See, e.g., ArA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 7720.
104. General statutes of this nature are found in several states. See, e.g., CAL. CODE
CIV. PRoc. (Deering, 1937) § 1875.
[Vol. 47, 194
FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULES
facts which could be judicially noticed would be most unwieldy; it is
impossible to provide a rule for every contingency. What is now con-
sidered fact may some day be considered disputable, and vice versa. One
cannot provide by rule for these unpredictables. But one can, by rule,
impress upon the court that it is not to be bound, nor necessarily to be
guided, by precedent, that it may notice matters which are only locally
or specially notorious, and further, that it may take judicial notice of
many matters which could not be said to be notorious, if they are capable
of such positive and exact proof that no imposition is likely.'"0 It might
be argued that a trend toward liberalization of this rule of evidence would
increase the number of cases in which judicial notice is taken of facts
whose demonstrable trust is questionable.' 7 But there is no reason to
believe a court would accept probabilities knowing them to be only such.
Further, the process of judicial notice allows for rebuttal, and if the
fact is disputed, it becomes matter for proof. The following rule is
therefore proposed:
Judicial Notice. (a) Foreign and Domestic Law. The court may
take judicial notice of the law of a foreign State, colony or other
possession thereof, of the rules and regulations adopted under au-
thority by executive departments of the United States, and the
several States, Territories, and other jurisdictions of the United
States, and of private statutes and municipal ordinances. For the
purpose of ascertaining the same, the court may refer to such sources
as may be deemed authentic, including briefs of counsel, and may
otherwise require the assistance of counsel; or the court may require
such evidence by testimony or otherwise as may seem proper. In
all cases it shall be the function of the court, and not of a jury, to
determine the existence and effect of law.
(b) Matters of Common Knowledge. The court shall take judi-
cial notice of any matter of common knowledge within the juris-
diction or within the jurisdiction from which a case is brought, and
of any other matter not capable of bona fide dispute. For the purpose
of ascertaining whether a matter is of common knowledge, or not
capable of bona fide dispute, the court may refer to such sources as
may be deemed authentic, and may require the assistance of counsel.
The rules which have been proposed above are few; they cover situa-
tions urgently in need of attention and they are not without precedent.
It is believed that it will not be very difficult to secure their adoption and
that their application will increase greatly the efficiency of the federal
courts.
105. See N. D. Com.. LAWs AN,. (1913) §§ 7937, 7938, which list seventy-six items
to be judicially noticed.
106. See 5 VIGmORE, EVIDENCE 579, 599-600.
107. See (1935) 15 B. U. L REV. 385.
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